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Oliver Lipps
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Little is known about sample behavior and fieldwork effects of different incentives introduced
in a household panel survey. This is especially true for telephone surveys. In a randomized
experiment, the Swiss Household Panel implemented one prepaid and two promised non-
monetary incentives in the range of 10 to 15 Swiss Francs (7-10 e), plus a no incentive control
group. The aim of the paper is to compare effects of these incentives especially on cooper-
ation, but also on sample selection and fieldwork effort, separated by the household and the
subsequent individual level. We find small positive cooperation effects of the prepaid incentive
on both the household and the individual level especially in larger households. Sample com-
position is affected to a very minor extent. Finally, incentives tend to save fieldwork time and
partially the number of contacts needed on the individual level.
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Introduction
In many household panel surveys, there is a two-stage
sequential response procedure (e.g. Frick et al., 2007): First
the household reference person is asked to provide informa-
tion on the household in the household grid questionnaire.
Only after all interview eligible individuals are known, they
can be asked to complete the survey. In addition to the
household grid (and consequently all individual question-
naires), individual questionnaires are at risk to be refused
especially by individuals other than the household refer-
ence person. This holds especially true in telephone surveys
(Lipps, 2009): unlike in face-to-face surveys, usually not
all eligible household members can be interviewed at once.
To reduce attrition, measures must be effective on all sam-
ple members. First, it is crucial to convince the household
reference person, who can be considered as a gatekeeper, to
cooperate. Next, all household members must be motivated
to answer the survey. Using different incentives can possibly
accommodate this sequential survey design. Up to now, often
the same incentives are used for all sample members. An ex-
amination of different incentives that are designed to reduce
attrition on the household and the individual level separately
is however still lacking in the literature. This research tries
to tackle this problem. In addition, we consider effects of
different incentives on sample selection and fieldwork effort
on both levels.
The article is organized as follows: first we review the
literature on effects of incentives in both cross-sectional and
longitudinal surveys. Next, we set up the hypotheses on the
effects which we expect from an incentive experiment, which
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is described together with the data used. We analyze attrition
and sample selection effects, and effects on fieldwork effort,
distinguished by grid and individual level. We summarize
and conclude in the last chapter.
Theoretic Considerations
Incentives are used to encourage and motivate survey
sample members to see their participation as being valued
and help the interviewer through the process of reciprocity
and social interaction. Several theories have been proposed
and tested to explain how incentives affect the respondent’s
decision to participate in surveys (see for an overview e.g.
Ryu, Couper, and Marans, 2006). For example, the economic
exchange theory considers incentives as a compensation for
the respondent’s time and efforts invested to complete the
survey. The social exchange theory (Dillman, 2000) explains
that small prepaid incentives work in many cases by demon-
strating trust that the potential respondent will answer the
survey. Closely related is the principle of reciprocity, i.e. the
norm that people should help those who helped them. An
explanation why different individuals react differently on in-
centives is provided by the leverage-salience theory (Groves,
Singer, and Corning, 2000). Individuals perceive and value
the same survey attribute (e.g. topic, sponsor, or incentive) in
different ways. This thus has different effects on the decision
to participate (Groves and Couper, 1998).
Evidence in Cross-sectional Surveys
Generally, monetary incentives are more effective than
gifts, and prepaid incentives result in significantly higher re-
sponse rates compared to incentives that are conditional on
participation (Singer et al., 1999; Singer, 2002). In a series
of experiments on the monthly conducted random digit dial
(RDD) telephone U.S. Survey of Consumer Attitudes (SCA),
Singer, van Hoewyk and Maher (2000) find that prepaid in-
centives enclosed with advance letters have positive effects
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on response in telephone surveys, especially among those
who had initially refused to participate. Such positive effects
need not be true with promised incentives, which Becker,
Imhof and Mehlkop (2007) test in mail surveys. Also, pre-
paid incentives may be able to reduce the number of calls
on sample members after having established contact. James
(1997) and Curtin, Singer and Presser (2007) show that while
incentives reduce the number of calls needed in face-to-face
and RDD surveys, the amount paid may have different effects
on response. Brick et al. (2006) also report positive response
effects from prepaid cash incentives in an RDD survey, but
also diminishing effects per amount of incentive. Finally,
prepaid incentives do not seem to affect the sample composi-
tion.
Also forms the incentive takes, plays a role: For exam-
ple, Lengacher et al. (1995) find in a face-to-face panel sur-
vey among older individuals that compared with a cash pay-
ment or a gift, charitable giving tends to increase subsequent
wave response rates among those who were already cooper-
ative respondents. The conclusion is that charitable giving
can be viewed as a proxy for altruistic activities more gen-
erally, including seeing participating in social surveys as a
civic duty (Laurie and Lynn, 2009). Lottery incentives are
not uncommon in household surveys, probably because they
allow for easy administration (e.g. Hansen, 2006). Accord-
ing to Singer (2002), “lotteries function as promised cash
incentives” (p. 6) that can be “coded as a monetary incen-
tive with a value equivalent to the prize divided by the num-
ber of subjects in that experimental condition” (Singer et al.,
1999:221). Simmons and Wilmot (2004) and Hansen (2006)
however, consider lotteries as a nonmonetary incentive. Re-
search suggests that lotteries are less effective than prepaid
incentives in stimulating survey response (Singer and Kulka,
2000) but might be more attractive to individuals who are
less risk averse (Holt and Laury, 2002). Stamps sent with
the advance letter have a monetary value and have properties
similar to phone cards, which are often used as incentives
(Teisl et al., 2006).
Evidence in Panel Surveys
While there are many studies on incentives effects in
cross-sectional surveys, only few studies exist in longitu-
dinal surveys. This is on one hand surprising because to
keep respondents in the sample is essential for the survival
of panel surveys. On the other, it may be dangerous to ex-
periment with panel sample members, who have participated
since many waves. It was only recently that Laurie and Lynn
(2009) extensively reviewed the use of incentives in longi-
tudinal surveys. They report that while attrition can be re-
duced, incentives do not affect sample composition. Ja¨ckle
and Lynn (2008) find similar results from an incentive exper-
iment in a UK panel survey of young people. It is shown that
positive effects on retention rates are larger for unconditional
than conditional incentives.
Several sources suggest positive effects even when small
incentives are given (e.g., Laurie and Lynn, 2009). Although
attrition may already have left a sample which is essentially
fairly cooperative, the British Household Panel Survey had
good experiences with a small increase of a prepaid voucher
from £7 to £10 per respondent, even after 14 waves of data
collection. This was especially the case for those who did
not respond in the wave before the incentive increase, being
thus an effective strategy for reluctant respondents. Simi-
larly, Martin, Abreu and Winters (2001), introducing incen-
tives in waves 8 and 9 of the US Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP), show that these are able to im-
prove refusal conversion rates.
Cost Issues
Incentives do not only incur costs, but might also re-
duce fieldwork efforts. For example, Singer, van Hoewyk
and Maher (2000) find that a $ 5 incentive included with an
advance letter significantly reduced both the number of calls
in a telephone survey to work a case and the number of in-
terim refusals. For the face-to-face SIPP and the US Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS), incentives reduced the num-
ber of calls that interviewers needed to make at wave 1 (cited
in Laurie and Lynn, 2009). While Brick et al. (2006) do not
observe strong differences between the incentive experiment
groups in the RDD administered US National Household Ed-
ucation Survey (NHES), Curtin, Singer and Presser (2007)
find moderately negative incentive effects on the number of
calls in the RDD SCA, and Rodgers (2002) considerable cost
savings from the reduced number of calls in the face-to-face
administered HRS. Haggerty et al. (2000) finds an even “dra-
matically reduced” (p. 1272) number of calls per completed
case in small business surveys.
Hypotheses
We expect the following effects:
1. Providing an unconditional incentive to the household is
effective as a “door-opener” also for the skeptical house-
holds. Compared to the situation without incentive, we
expect:
a.) higher household grid completion rates1, especially in
samples that are introduced later.
b.) no difference with respect to the household sample
composition.2
Because of the announcement in the advance letter, we ex-
pect smaller but also positive effects from incentives that are
conditional on individual participation. This is because the
1 Throughout this paper we use the AAPOR (2008) definitions
COOP1 for the cooperation rate, REF1 for the refusal rate, and RR1
for the response rate.
2 Although the longitudinal unit in household panel surveys is
the single individual, in order to analyze household level attrition, it
is necessary to follow the household. We let the household in which
the last year’s household reference person lives represent the house-
hold. In case a household splits, we follow the household where the
reference person from the previous wave resides. Note that the in
the SHP, the household reference person remains the same after a
wave with a probability of almost 90%. In face-to-face household
panel surveys a change of the household reference person is even
less probable between waves (Lipps 2009).
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reference person might not want to exclude other household
members (and him/herself) from benefitting from the condi-
tional incentive by not completing the household grid.
2. Once the household grid is completed, incentives condi-
tional on individual participation are expected to motivate
all eligible household members to answer the individual
questionnaires. Relative to the situation without individ-
ual incentives, we expect
a.) higher individual completion rates, especially in sam-
ples that are introduced later.
b.) different individual sample composition effects de-
pending on the conditional incentive used.
The unconditional incentive is expected to have a positive
effect also on individual participation that might however be
smaller than that from the conditional incentives.
3. Relative to the situation without incentives, we expect re-
duced fieldwork efforts from all incentives on both
a.) the grid and
b.) the individual level.
Incentive Experiment
In 2006, the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) implemented
an experiment which used three incentive groups plus a no
incentive group as a control. It was decided not to use cash,
because the incentive should not be misunderstood as a mon-
etary compensation for the time and efforts invested by the
sample members, but rather as a token of appreciation. Due
to the relatively small budget, the incentives were not to ex-
ceed a certain value. Furthermore a large experimental sam-
ple was planned to be able to analyze effects for subgroups,
if necessary. Of course, decision in favor of a higher value of
the incentives or a larger sample size was a trade-off. Easy
administration was an additional condition. All other com-
munications with panel households already conducted in for-
mer waves are maintained, for example a newsletter with sur-
vey results, and advance letters (now with different content,
according to the incentive delivered) sent to each household.
A random quarter of all households that answered in the pre-
vious wave were divided into one of the following groups:
• No incentives (control group). No incentives were
mentioned in the advance letter. Here, the content of
the letter was similar to that of the previous years.
• Stamps. These households were sent 12 stamps at 1
Swiss Francs (about 8.00 e) unconditionally with the
advance letter. The stamps were printed with the SHP
logo.
• Lottery. These households were told in the advance
letter that each respondent to the individual question-
naire will participate in a lottery with three prizes: 1.)
5,000 Swiss Francs 2.) 3,000 Swiss Francs, and 3.)
2,000 Swiss Francs. The monetary value per respon-
dent amounts to 5.55 e.3
• Donation. Households in this group are told in the
advance letter that each respondent to complete the
individual questionnaire may donate 10 Swiss Francs
(about 6.67 e) to a charity, to be selected from a list at
the end of the interview.
Data
The SHP is a centralized CATI panel survey aiming to ob-
serve social change, in particular the dynamics of changing
living conditions in Switzerland. The SHP survey started in
1999 with slightly more than 5000 randomly selected house-
holds. Each year, the household reference person is asked to
report the current household composition together with ba-
sic socio-demographic characteristics in the household grid.
Completion of the grid questionnaire takes two to ten min-
utes, depending on household size and complexity of rela-
tionships. Then, the household questionnaire is to be com-
pleted (about 10 minutes), again by the reference person.
Finally, each household member from the age of 14 on has
to complete his/her own individual questionnaire (about 35
minutes), including the reference person.
To keep the sample size at a reasonable level, a refreshment
sample has been added in 2004. Like the original sample
from 1999, also the refreshment sample is representative of
the Swiss residential population. The original and the re-
freshment sample each contain about 2,500 successfully in-
terviewed households in 2005. There is no different treat-
ment of the samples. In particular, neither the members of
the original sample nor those of the refreshment sample ob-
tained incentives before the experiment, other than the usual
SHP newsletter.
Until wave seven (2005), the attrition rate on the grid level
amounts to between 11% (in 2000, 2001), 13% (in 2003,
2005), and even slightly more than 15% (2002, 2004) (Lipps,
2009). As for individual attrition conditional on household
grid completion, the rates amount to between 4% (2003), 5%
(2005), 6% (2001, 2002), to 8% (2000, 2004). Concern-
ing bias, the young4 and the old, male headed, not work-
ing, and smaller households tend to attrite to a higher extent.
Selection due to individual attrition is effective towards the
middle-aged, thus aggravating bias already from household
attrition, and those living with a partner. With respect to
socio economic and attitudinal variables, foreigners, the so-
cially and politically excluded, those who are mostly dissat-
isfied with various aspects in their life, and those who exhibit
a worse reporting behaviour in previous waves show higher
attrition (Lipps, 2007).
In addition to the nonrespondents from the 2005 wave,
households whose address was not known or who sent back
the newsletter between the 2005 and the 2006 wave are ex-
cluded from the experiment. This is predominantly because
of the risk that in such households the advance letters noti-
fying them of the incentive are not read. By using this pro-
cedure, there are only very few (2.2%) refusing individuals
from the previous wave in the sample. We exclude previous
refusers for the analyses. In addition, because the reasons
driving noncontacts and refusals are different (Groves and
3 Each group contains about 1,000 households with each around
1.5 eligible respondents. Assuming a response rate of 80% (1,200
respondents), the monetary value for each participant amounts to
8.3 Swiss Francs (5,55 e).
4 Household socio-demographic characteristics are represented
by the household reference person (Lipps, 2009).
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Couper, 1998), and incentives are more effective to reduce
refusals rather than not contacted sample members (Singer
and Kulka, 2000), we do not take into account sample mem-
bers that could not be contacted in 2006.
In Table 1, the sample randomization results, distinguished
by original and refreshment sample, are depicted.
Results
Household Level
Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 contain the 2006 grid response
rates, separated by incentive group and household size, for
the total, the original, and the refreshment sample, respec-
tively.5
Using Fisher’s exact test, we find that in both the total
and the refreshment sample, the response rate of the stamps
group in all and in 3+ person households is significantly
higher than in the donation group. In addition the stamps
group outperforms the control group in case of 2-person
households in the original sample.6
Hypothesis 1a (higher grid response rates with conditional
incentive) cannot be rejected. Higher cooperation does how-
ever not hold for the conditional incentives.
Next, we test for different sample composition effects, us-
ing the sample with a completed reference person individual
questionnaire in 2005. The dependent variable equals 1 if
the grid questionnaire in 2006 is completed, 0 else. We first
include (the few) independent variables that were shown to
be affected by incentives in the literature, like sample matu-
rity, social inclusion (employment status, married, education,
health, satisfaction with life, political interest, participation)
and respondent behavior assessment during the interview by
the interviewer. Age and sex are added because some selec-
tion effects have been shown in surveys that observe special
age groups only. All independent variables included affect
attrition in the SHP (Lipps, 2007; Voorpostel, 2010 or in
other panel surveys (Laurie and Lynn, 2009; Ryu, Couper,
and Marans, 2006; Voogt and Saris, 2003).
Individual level variables are taken from the 2005 reference
person questionnaires:
• original sample (first asked in 1999) vs. refreshment
sample (first asked in 2004)
• number of children under the age of 18 in the house-
hold
• full time employment of reference person (2005)
• reference person male (2005)
• reference person married
• reference person age
• reference person age squared
• education level of reference person (8 ordinal degrees
in 2005)
• health status (1 (very bad) -5 (very good))
• satisfaction with life (0 (very bad) -10 (very good))
• political interest (0 (absolutely not) -10 (a great deal))
• participation in clubs or groups
• Interviewer assessment: respondent behaves friendly
(1 (hostile) - 4 (friendly)
• Interviewer assessment: respondent understands ques-
tions (1 (poor) - 3 (good))
• Interviewer assessment: respondent difficult to get (1
(vey difficult) - 4 (easy))
• Interviewer assessment: respondent repeats in next
wave (1 (no) - 4 (absolutely))
Using multinomial logit models with the incentive as de-
pendent variable, the coefficients of each incentive group
with the control group as base are listed in Table 5.
Two coefficients are significant in the donation-control
comparison model: households from the original sample and
those who are more difficult to be convinced to participate
show a slightly (5% level) higher grid participation. The
first group of households tend to attrite to a lesser, the latter
to a higher extent in the SHP (Lipps, 2007). Based on the
high number of variables (16) entered in the models, it could
be expected that a small number of variables are significant.
Therefore we do not consider the sample composition of the
incentive and the control group to be different.
Hypothesis 1b (no different sample composition effects)
cannot be rejected.
Finally, we check if the incentive has an influence on the
effort necessary to work a case until the final response status
is determined. We compare the number of calls that result
in a noncontact, the number of actual contacts, and the total
number of days it takes from the first until the last call. To
control the effect from unobserved household effects, we cal-
culate the difference between the 2006 (experiment) and the
2005 values (∆) for each household. Similar to the analysis
of selection effects, we use multinomial logit models with the
incentive as dependent, and the 2006-2005 fieldwork effort
differences as independent variable. For comparison reasons,
we exclude households that do not cooperate in 2006.7 For
completeness, we depict the fieldwork effort measures from
2005 in Table 6 in addition. For example, it took on average
2.8 contacts to work a household grid in the control group.
None of the within household differences in any of the in-
centive groups turn out to be significant when compared with
the control group.
Hypothesis 3a (reduced fieldwork efforts on the grid level)
must be rejected.
Individual Level
Because grid questionnaire completion is necessary before
individuals can be contacted, individual response behavior is
analyzed conditional on grid completion. Tables 8 through
5 Throughout the paper we will use the .05 (=5%) significance
level.
6 Note that there are also significant differences between cells
from the original sample (table not shown). Due to a too small cell
size, however, we do not comment on them here.
7 Ultimately non-cooperating households need much more calls
and fieldwork time. Because the sample is limited to the 2005 re-
spondents, we must therefore drop the 2006 nonrespondents.
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT INCENTIVES ON ATTRITION AND FIELDWORK EFFORT IN TELEPHONE HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEYS 85
Table 1: Randomization of Sample for Incentive Experiment (Households with 2005 completed Grid).
SHP original Sample SHP Refreshment Sample
(started 1999) (started 2004)
n % n %
Control 622 25.2 468 25.2
Stamps 613 24.8 475 25.5
Lottery 597 24.2 475 25.5
Donations 637 25.8 442 23.8
All Households 2,469 100.0 1,860 100.0
Table 2: Response Rates Grid 2006 in all Incentive and Control Groups, all Households
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 88.1 1.9 294 87.7 1.7 367 91.1 1.4 429 89.2 0.9 1090
Stamps 87.8 1.9 303 91.4 1.6 339 92.4 1.3 446 90.8 0.9 1088
Lottery 89.3 1.9 272 87.6 1.7 372 90.4 1.4 428 89.2 0.9 1072
Donations 84.7 2.2 281 87.1 1.8 363 88.0 1.6 435 86.8 1.0 1079
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in the donation group in all and in 3+ Person households.
10 show the individual response rates in 2006, distinguished
by incentive group, as well as for the maturity of the sample:8
In the combined sample, the stamps group outperforms
(5%) all other groups for the larger households and for
all households. In the original sample, cooperation of the
stamps group in all and in 3+ person households is signifi-
cantly (5%) higher than that of the control group. In addi-
tion, the control group outperforms both conditional incen-
tive groups if all households are combined. Finally, in the
refreshment sample, cooperation of the stamps group in all
and in 3+ person households is significantly higher than that
of the lottery group only. Similar to the situation in the orig-
inal sample, the control group outperforms the lottery group
if all households are combined.
Hypothesis 2a (higher individual completion rates) again
holds for the prepaid incentive only, and must be rejected for
the individual conditional incentives.
Also for individuals, we analyze sample composition ef-
fects, using the same independent variables as in the case of
households, plus the binary variable reference person status.
Like in the analysis of household selection effects, we com-
pare the coefficients of each incentive group with those of
the control group, using multinomial logit models with the
incentive as dependent variable (see Table 11).
In the stamps group, we find that the number of children
in the household, dissatisfaction with life, and participation
in clubs or groups is associate with a slightly (5%) higher
attrition relative to the control group. In the lottery group,
there are no selection effects compared to the control group.
Members of the donations group exhibit smaller (1%) attri-
tion among the original sample, and slightly higher among
the middle aged.9 The effects are not consistent, as for ex-
ample in the stamps group, we expected a reduction of the
attrition among those who usually tend to attrite to a higher
extent, like the childless or those who do not participate in
clubs. The same interpretation holds for the selection effects
in the donations group. We therefore do not consider the (few
and mostly on the 5% level only) significant selection effects
as causal effects due to the incentives.
Hypothesis 2b (different composition effects) must be re-
jected.
Also on the individual level, we analyze fieldwork effort
effects, using the same methods than for households (see Ta-
bles 12 and 13).
Compared to the control group, there is a significantly (1%)
smaller number of fieldwork days necessary in all incentive
groups to work an individual, compared with the control
group. In the lottery group, the number of contacts is also
significantly smaller.
Hypothesis 3b (reduced fieldwork efforts on the individual
level) cannot be rejected.
Summary and Conclusion
The Experiment
Based on an incentive experiment, this study analyzes attri-
tion in the CATI Swiss Household Panel (SHP) survey both
on the household (1st response stage) and the subsequent
individual (2nd response stage) level, using three incentive
groups and one control group. The prepaid household in-
centives (stamps) amount to a monetary value of 12 Swiss
Francs (about 8 e), the individual expected value of the con-
ditional lottery incentive to 8.33 Swiss Francs, and the con-
ditional charity donation incentive to 10 Swiss Francs, for
8 The strong differences by household size are due to the fact that
reference persons generally cooperate once they completed the grid
and the likelihood to be reference person decreases with household
size.
9 Note from Table 11 that the age relation to higher completion
is u-shaped.
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Table 3: Response Rates Grid 2006 in all Incentive and Control Groups, Original Sample
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 92.1 2.1 1646 90.6 2.0 203 94.9 1.4 255 92.8 1.0 622
Stamps 91.7 2.2 157 96.4 1.3 197 94.6 1.4 259 94.5 0.9 613
Lottery 89.8 2.5 147 94.1 1.6 205 94.3 1.5 245 93.1 1.0 597
Donations 87.3 2.7 157 93.4 1.7 212 93.7 1.5 268 92.0 1.1 637
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in the control group in 2 person households.
Table 4: Response Rates Grid 2006 in all Incentive and Control Groups, Refreshment Sample
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 83.1 3.3 130 84.1 2.9 164 85.6 2.7 174 84.4 1.7 468
Stamps 83.6 3.1 146 84.5 3.0 142 89.3 2.3 187 86.1 1.6 475
Lottery 88.8 2.8 125 79.6 3.1 167 85.2 2.6 183 84.2 1.7 475
Donations 81.4 3.5 124 78.1 3.4 151 79.0 3.2 167 79.4 1.9 442
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in the donation group in all and in 3+ person households.
Table 5: Multinomial Logit Coefficients by Incentive (n=3,853)
Grid Completion in 2006, relative to Control Group
Stamps Lottery Donations
Original Sample .04 (.10) .04 (.10) .22 (.10)∗
Number of children -.05 (.06) .02 (.06) -.01 (.06)
Full time employment .15 (.13) -.02 (.13) .01 (.13)
Male -.05 (.12) .09 (.12) .01 (.12)
Married .04 (.11) -.06 (.11) .01 (.11)
Age -.00 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.03 (.02)
Age squared .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Education .00 (.02) -.01 (.01) .01 (.02)
Health .01 (.08) .02 (.08) .02 (.08)
Satisfaction life .05 (.03) .00 (.03) .02 (.03)
Political interest -.01 (.02) -.02 (.02) .00 (.02)
Participation -.08 (.10) -.03 (.10) -04 (.10)
Is friendly -.15 (.15) .20 (.15) -.18 (.15)
Understands questions .18 (.14) -.16 (.13) .05 (.14)
Is difficult Case .04 (.19) .30 (.19) .44 (.19)∗
Will repeat wave -.06 (.09) -.02 (.10) .08 (.10)
Base: Control Group. Data: Households with 2005 responding Reference Persons.
∗ significant on 5% Level.
Table 6: Fieldwork Effort: 2005, Multinomial Logit Coefficients by Incentive
Mean Number Mean Number Mean Number
n Noncontacts Contacts Days
Control 972 6.2 (0.4) 2.8 (0.1) 18.9 (0.9)
Stamps 988 6.8 (0.5) 2.7 (0.1) 18.1 (0.8)
Lottery 956 6.8 (0.6) 2.7 (0.1) 19.7 (0.9)
Donations 937 7.0 (0.6) 2.9 (0.1) 20.3 (1.0)
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Table 7: ∆ Fieldwork Effort 2006-2005, relative to Control Group (n=3,853)
Stamps Lottery Donations
Nr. Noncontacts -.000 (.002) -.002 (.002) -.003 (.002)
Nr. Contacts .007 (.014) .002 (.014) .007 (.014)
Nr. Days -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.000 (.001)
Base: Control Group. Data: Households with 2006 completed Grid.
Table 8: Response Rates for Individuals in 2006 (all Incentive and Control Groups)
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 96.9 1.1 258 83.2 1.6 554 78.1 1.3 991 82.4 0.9 1803
Stamps 97.0 1.1 264 85.3 1.5 538 81.9 1.2 996 85.2 0.8 1798
Lottery 97.1 1.1 242 82.2 1.6 557 77.1 1.4 945 81.5 0.9 1744
Donations 96.2 1.2 237 83.6 1.6 555 78.2 1.3 976 82.3 0.9 1768
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in all other incentive groups in all and in 3+ person households.
each participating individual. On both the household and the
individual level, we expect motivation to participate to be
higher if incentives are offered, with different composition
effects due to incentives only on the individual level. Due to
increased panel loyalty, we expect these effects to be higher
in the sample that was introduced later, then in its 3rd wave,
compared to the original sample, then in its 8th wave. Finally
we hypothesize some cost saving effects until a final response
status is obtained.
Findings and Limitations
With respect to completing the household grid, while the
prepaid incentive outperforms the control in 2-person house-
holds in the original sample only, members of one of the con-
ditional incentive groups (donations) cooperate worse than
those of the prepaid group in all households and in 3+ per-
son households in both the refreshment and the combined
sample. Relative to the control group, there are no sample
composition effects in any of the incentive groups. Finally,
there is no reduction of fieldwork effort needed to work a
case.
Given the household grid is filled, as for individual ques-
tionnaire completion, there is also a higher participation due
to the unconditional incentive, and outperforms all other in-
centive groups. In the original sample, the unconditional in-
centive outperforms the control group only, in the refresh-
ment sample, one conditional incentive group (lottery). Also
interesting, the control group members show a higher par-
ticipation than both conditional incentive groups in the case
of the original sample, and one conditional incentive group
(lottery) in the case of the refreshment sample. Also on the
level of the individual, although there are some weak sam-
ple composition effects, they are not systematically related
to what could be expected from the literature. Finally as for
cost saving effects, relative to the control group, all incentive
groups appear to significantly shorten the fieldwork duration.
A limitation is the slight difference in monetary equivalents
of the incentives per respondent. We however believe that
they are nonetheless comparable. Overall, it may be that the
size of the incentives was too small to induce stronger and
more systematic effects in a panel, where the newest sample
is already in its third wave.
A Consequence for the SHP and general Sugges-
tions
In the literature there is evidence that incentives may be ef-
fective to increase response especially among sample mem-
bers with low response propensities, for example during re-
fusal conversion (e.g. Singer, Groves, and Corning, 1999;
Lengacher et al., 1995). Rodgers finds that “the greatest
cost-benefit ratio would likely have been achieved by offer-
ing the higher incentive to households in which there was
non-response at the previous wave” (2002, p. 2933). Ac-
knowledging this, and given the results of the incentive ex-
periment described in this paper, the SHP decided to send a
50 Swiss Francs voucher with the advance letter to the house-
holds, who refused in the previous wave, in the 2007 wave.
A logit model of grid completion results in a significantly
higher response, when compared with a roughly similar sam-
ple from the previous (2006) wave. Unfortunately, however,
it is not possible to make these samples fully comparable in
this nonexperimental setting.
To draw a conclusion, it is very likely that while effects
from small or mid valued incentives are quickly decreasing
with the maturity of the panel, more reluctant sample mem-
bers probably remain sensitive to higher monetary incentives.
Generally, we suggest considering the value and the form of
incentives to be introduce in a mature panel very carefully.
With respect to the latter, if incentives are conditional on
participation, our findings show that they could backfire in
reduced cooperation behaviors.
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Table 9: Response Rates for Individuals in 2006 (all Incentive and Control Groups)
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 96.7 1.5 150 87.1 1.9 302 81.1 1.6 576 85.1 1.1 1028
Stamps 99.3 0.7 142 90.1 1.7 312 86.6 1.4 566 89.4 1.0 1020
Lottery 99.2 0.8 131 88.2 1.8 314 83.5 1.6 546 87.1 1.1 991
Donations 97.1 1.5 136 87.8 1.8 337 82.4 1.5 631 85.9 1.0 1104
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in the control group in all and in 3+ person households. In addition, the control group outperforms (5%) the lottery and the
donation groups if all households are combined.
Table 10: Response Rates for Individuals in 2006 (all Incentive and Control Groups)
1 Pers.Household 2 Pers.Household 3+Pers.Household All Households
% SE n % SE n % SE n % SE n
Control 97.2 1.6 108 78.6 2.6 252 74.0 2.2 415 78.8 1.5 775
Stamps 94.2 2.1 122 78.8 2.7 226 75.8 2.1 430 79.6 1.4 778
Lottery 94.6 2.2 111 74.5 2.8 243 68.4 2.3 399 74.2 1.6 753
Donations 95.0 2.2 101 77.1 2.9 218 70.4 2.5 345 76.4 1.7 664
Note: Cooperation is higher (5%) in the stamps than in the lottery group in all and in 3+ person households. In addition, the control group outperforms (5%) the lottery group if all
households are combined.
Table 11: Multinomial Logit Coefficients of Incentives
Individual Completion in 2006 (n=5,130)
Stamps Lottery Donations
Reference Person 06 .01 (.09) .11 (.09) .13 (.09)
Original Sample .02 (.08) .07 (.08) .28 (.08)∗∗
Number of children -.10 (.04)∗ .05 (.04) .00 (.04)
Full time employment .19 (.10) .06 (.11) .08 (.11)
Male -.13 (.09) -.06 (.09) -.14 (.09)
Married -.01 (.10) -.07 (.10) .07 (.10)
Age -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.03 (.01)∗
Age squared .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)∗
Education .00 (.01) -.02 (.02) .00 (.01)
Health -.04 (.06) .01 (.07) .01 (.06)
Satisfaction life .06 (.03)∗ .03 (.03) .01 (.03)
Political interest -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) .00 (.02)
Participation -.19 (.08)∗ -.04 (.08) -.02 (.08)
Is friendly -.08 (.12) .00 (.12) -.09 (.12)
Understands questions .06 (.11) -.09 (.11) .12 (.12)
Is difficult Case .13 (.16) -.03 (.16) .20 (.15)
Will repeat wave .02 (.06) -.04 (.08) .01 (.08)
Base: Control Group. Data: 2005 Individual Completion.∗ significant on 5%, ∗∗ significant on 1% Level.
Table 12: Fieldwork Effort 2005, Multinomial Logit Coefficients by Incentive
Mean Number Mean Number Mean Number
n Noncontacts Contacts Days
Control 1,326 5.2 (.4) 2.7 (.1) 13.8 (.6)
Stamps 1,402 5.4 (.4) 2.7 (.1) 14.6 (.6)
Lottery 1,269 5.4 (.4) 2.9 (.1) 15.0 (.6)
Donations 1,300 4.8 (.3) 2.7 (.1) 14.7 (.6)
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Table 13: ∆ Fieldwork Effort 2006-2005, relative to Control Group n=5,952
Stamps Lottery Donations
Nr. Noncontacts -.002 (.002) -.003 (.002) -.002 (.002)
Nr. Contacts -.015 (.010) -.028 (.001)∗∗ -.019 (.010)
Nr. Days -.004 (.001)∗∗ -.006 (.002)∗∗ -.005 (.002)∗∗
Base: Control Group. Data: Individuals with 2006 completed Questionnaire.
∗∗ significant on 1% Level (only differences).
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